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numerous proceedings to litigate several substantive offenses arising from one
transaction may well be subject to criticism even though common questions of
fact and law are not involved. When the subsequent proceedings involve substantially identical evidence, requiring no additional proof to that shown in
the first trial, the immunity offered by Section 1938 provides little protection
when applied as it was here.
The decision in the instant case also tends to obscure the fact that although an additional element had to be proved in the first prosecution, i.e.,
the homicide while the felony was in progress, the offense, at least to some of
the co-defendants involved, is the same in both prosecutions, in fact and in law.
Their single act of participating in the felony did not offend against two statutes. Although they were, through legislative definition, held accountable
to conviction under both, in each trial their single offense is identical.
As a question of fairness, the defendant is forced to run the gantlet on
a charge which gives the jury only a single alternative to conviction of murder
in the first degree, an outright acquittal. And this is merely because the prosecution considers this form of indictment as offering less of an advantage to the
defendant. Yet, having successfully defended the charge, the accused must
again submit to another charge that should properly have been considered and
disposed of at the first trial.
With the number of statutory offenses greatly increased, and because of
the expense and delay involved in awaiting trial on burdened court calendars,
it appears that a formidable weapon has been forged to prevent release of an
individual currently running the gantlet of successive and related charges.
Regardless of the results desired in any specific problem before the courts, the
concept of double jeopardy should be deserving of a more acute analysis instead
of a somewhat mechanical approach.
RICHARD KANIA
LIMITATION ON EXPANDING SCOPE OF LEGALITY OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

IN MICHIGAN
For years prior to 1914, but even more so since that time, the states in
our country have vigorously belabored the issue of admissibility of evidence
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. The United States Supreme
Court stated its position on the subject in 1914 in the famous Weeks decision.1
The rule promulgated in that case, for the Federal courts to follow in instances
where a Federal officer did the searching, was that any evidence obtained in
the course of an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible. Such exclusion,
the court felt, was dictated by the Fourth Amendment to our Federal Constitution in order to safeguard the individual's right to privacy.
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914).
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Some states had applied the rule of exclusion prior to the Weeks decision
but the majority of the states were opposed to placing such an obstacle in the
way of successful apprehension of criminals. Since Weeks there has been a
gradual tendency in the direction of the exclusionary rule to the extent that
today there is about an even split among the states, half applying the Weeks
exclusionary rule and half adhering to a non-exclusionary policy.
New York exemplifies a state remaining firm in its application of a no
exclusion type procedure. The New York Court of Appeals stated its position
quite clearly in 1926 when it recognized that the Fourth Amendment, and its
application as construed in the Weeks case, was not made binding on the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 As long as the defendant is accorded a fair
trial, the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment, in so far as it embraces the
Fourth, are satisfied. The exclusion of evidence obtained during an illegal
search and seizure was not deemed necessary in order to guarantee a defendant
a fair trial. The need for efficient and effective law enforcement was considered
great enough to allow the possibility of an innocent person being subjected
to an invasion of his right to privacy.
Taking the position that illegal search and seizure is not necessary in
order to achieve an adequate enforcement of law and protection of society
against the criminal, the other half of our nation forbids the admission of
illegally obtained evidence. Michigan places itself among the states with this
sentiment in the Marxhausen case, a 1919 decision.8 The Weeks case apparently had a strong influence on the Marxhausen decision, since as late as 1911
Michigan professed adherence to the non-exclusion position. 4
Due to an increasing tendency among the states toward an acceptance of
the exclusionary rule, the question of what constitutes an illegal search and
seizure is a question growing in importance. Once a state adopts the Weeks
rationale, it must decide whether the search and seizure in a particular instance
is legal or illegal, for upon this determination rests the result: admissible as
evidence if legal; excluded if illegal. Michigan recently suggested a stringent
test for the legality of an automobile search in People v. Gonzales.5 An examination of the area of legal search and seizure of vehicles reveals the impact
of this decision.
The Federal courts, and the state courts following the Federal exclusionary
rule, have evolved a standard that a "reasonable" search- and seizure constitutes
a legal search and seizure for purposes of the admission of evidence. A reasonable search with a warrant has been determined to be one in which only that
which the warrant expressly authorizes is seized. With regard to searches
accompanying an arrest, only that which is incidental to the arrest is deemed
2.
3.
4.
5.

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919).
People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676, 130 N.W. 351 (1911).
356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959).
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to be reasonably seized, namely, the fruits of the crime; the means by which
it was committed; or instruments calculated to effect an escape from custody. 6
The courts have been reluctant to go any further in categorizing the term
"reasonable search and seizure." In fact the United States Supreme Court has
conceded its ineptness in attempting to arrive at a more definitive description
of the term, feeling that a case by case determination is the most satisfactory
7
procedure.
The Michigan Supreme Court encountered the problem of determining the
reasonableness of a search and seizure in People v. Case,8 a 1922 decision. In
that case the Court suggested that the location of the search was a relevant
factor in determining its reasonableness. The defendant had driven his automobile upon public fairgrounds where a county fair was in progress. The
sheriff, searching the grounds for suspected violation of the prohibition laws
then in effect, entered the defendant's parked, unoccupied truck and found
liquor. When the defendant confessed ownership of the truck, he was tried
and convicted of violating the prohibition laws. In affirming the conviction,
the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that the automobile is merely a means
of transportation for use on the public highways and is not actively used on
private premises which the law guards more zealously from search and seizure
without process. The availability of a search warrant for automobiles was ruled
an impractical method of search, since the mobility of a vehicle enabled it to
escape from the warrant's jurisdictional limits before the search could be
conducted. Since the automobile is found on the public highway, as opposed
to private premises, it was deemed not worthy of the high degree of protection
from intrusion that is accorded a person's home under the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment.
In Carroll v. United States,9 the United States Supreme Court added
weight to that 1922 Michigan decision by recognizing the relevance of a distinction between an automobile and a dwelling house in determining whether a
search and seizure was reasonable. The Court recalled how the First Congress
distinguished, as to the necessity for a search warrant, between goods subject
to forfeiture when they were concealed in a dwelling house, and like goods in
the course of transportation when concealed in a movable vessel. Congress
felt that it was not feasible to require a search warrant for vessels because
their mobile nature would allow them to escape the grips of the warrant after
it was obtained. The Carroll case suggested that the presence of probable
cause for believing a crime had been committed would make the search and
seizure within a vessel legal for purposes of admitting the evidence which was
obtained. The definition of probable cause relied upon by the Court is found
in Stacy v. Emery: "If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such
6. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
7. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
8. People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N.W. 289 (1922).
9. People v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has
been committed, it is sufficient,"'1 that is, they constitute probable cause.
The opinion in the Carroll case seems to indicate that more freedom will
be allowed to an arresting officer in searching vessels without a warrant, than
is accorded to an officer- making an arrest and searching within a dwelling
place. The Court doesn't appear to limit him to the requirement, in the case
of a misdemeanor, that the crime be committed in his presence. Yet, today
most of our states require the officer to witness a misdemeanor before he can
arrest a person for committing it. Is this suggesting that a valid arrest is not
a prerequisite to a valid search and seizure, at least when it concerns vessels?
If not, it is at least suggesting that probable cause will be valid grounds for
arrest in a vessel, and that a search and seizure of some degree will lawfully
follow once probable cause is found.
The Agnello decision in the United States Supreme Court,-" holding that a
search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable, followed closely on the heels of the Carroll decision, and further demonstrated
the recognition of a distinction between vessels and dwellings by distinctly
limiting its ruling to dwellings.
After the Carroll and Agnello decisions it soon became a commonly accepted policy among all the jurisdictions, both Federal and state, that warrants
were not necessary for a lawful search of vessels, and the policy was extended
to vehicles for the same reasons of practicality. Law enforcement officers, however, still were faced with the problem of meeting the "probable cause" requirement of the Carroll case.
As the automobile became more commonplace on the roads of Michigan
and more frequently used as a means of violating the laws of Michigan, the
Michigan Supreme Court loosened the control upon its police, and allowed
greater liberality in conducting searches and seizures of motor vehicles. In
1929, the Michigan police stopped a car and arrested the driver for speeding.
The automobile was searched and liquor was found in it. The Michigan Supreme Court sustained a conviction for the violation of the prohibition laws
on the theory that the arrest for speeding was lawful, and it was therefore
proper to search the car in which the arrested person was riding.' 2 The arrest
was considered probable cause for the search. The court indicated that a traffic
violaikon was sufficient reason for allowing the police to search the automobile.
Five years later, when the Michigan police approached an automobile
which they had stopped for speeding, they noticed the driver fumbling nervously in his pockets. They searched him and found a pistol in his pocket. The
Michigan Supreme Court sustained his conviction for illegal possession of a
weapon although the only provocation for the search and seizure was the fum10. Stacy v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, at 645 (1878).
11. Supra note 6.
12. People v. Davis, 247 Mich. 536, 226 N.W. 337 (1929).
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bling in the pockets. 13 The defendant could very well have been trying to
locate his driver's license instead of a pistol. It certainly cannot be said that
it is unusual for a driver who has been stopped by the police to get his driver's
license and car registration out of his pocket for police investigation before
being asked to do so by the police. It seems, therefore, that this is in essence
another instance where a traffic violation prompted a search and seizure which
was recognized as legal by the Michigan Supreme Court.
These latter two cases represent the furthest extent to which the Michigan
Supreme Court had allowed police to penetrate the interior of the privately
owned automobile prior to 1936. These decisions were reached even though
Michigan followed the exclusionary rule and the State Constitution of Michigan
contained a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.' 4 Article 2, section 10 of the Michigan Constitution reads as follows:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to
search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation.
As was already noted, Michigan exempted vehicle searches and seizures
from the requirement of obtaining a search warrant. The term "place" in Article
2, section 10 of the State Constitution was thereby confined to fixed locations,
presumably dwellings in most instances. The constitutional provision lists
"possessions" after person, houses, and papers when referring to items protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures. While the order of listing is not
conclusive, it may afford an indication of the degree of protection accorded to
each of these items. It is certainly safe to say that under ordinary circumstances
the individual's person, as distinguished from his house and possessions, merits
a degree of protection second to none. Perhaps it follows that possessions,
the category under which vehicles are placed, are rendered a lesser degree of
protection than the preceding categories in the provision.
While these observations are primarily speculative, it cannot be doubted
that houses and possessions are distinguished in the provision, since otherwise
the term "house" would be a redundancy, because a house is a possession
within the overall meaning of the term "possession."
In 1936, Article 2, section 10 was amended as follows:
Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not be
construed to bar from evidence in any court of criminal jurisdiction,
or in any criminal proceeding held before any magistrate or justice of
the peace, any firearm, rifle, pistol, revolver, automatic pistol, machine
13. People v. Liewis, 269 Mich. 382, 257 N.W. 843 (1934).

14. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."
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gun, bomb, bombshell, explosive, blackjack, slungshot, billy., metallic
knuckles, gas-ejecting device, or any other dangerous weapon or thing,
seized by any peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house
in this state.15
In effect, doesn't this amendment permit the admission of evidence obtained during an illegal search and seizure conducted someplace other than in
a dwelling when the article seized is categorized as dangerous? The amendment
reserves the sanctity of the dwelling house, but beyond that it puts a big dent
in Michigan's exclusionary rule. Not much, other than the general category
of "papers," remains protected from admission into evidence because of an
illegal search and seizure conducted outside the home.
Shortly after the amendment became effective, the Michigan Supreme
Court decided that the search of a car in which the lawfully arrested person
was riding was incidental to the arrest.16 In a second instance the Court held
that the police were justified in searching an automobile even though the
17
arrested person was not in it at the time of the arrest.
These cases, viewed in conjunction with the constitutional provisions and
amendments, present a discernible policy in the state of Michigan of allowing
police liberality within the bounds of legality regarding searches and seizures
of automobiles; a policy which appeared to be consistently adhered to until
last year when the Michigan Supreme Court wrote its majority opinion in
People v. Gonzales.'8

In the Gonzales case a car was stopped for a traffic violation, having only
one headlight burning. After the occupants were asked to get out of the car,
the police saw a pistol butt sticking out of the front seat. The police then
searched the individuals and found a .38 caliber cartridge in the pocket of one
of them. The court held that the evidence was admissible because the 1936
amendment to Article 2, section 10 was constitutionally authorized by Wolf v.
Colorado,'0 and was controlling in this situation since the evidence concerned
was a dangerous weapon. The part of the opinion which compelled attention
was the manner in which the court classified the search and seizure as illegal;
The language in the opinion indicated that no distinction between a person's
home and his possessions was tolerable. The Court seemed to say that since
the amendment permitted the admission of evidence obtained during an illegal
search and seizure in the case of dangerous weapons, it would retaliate for the
15. In 1952 an amendment added "any narcotic or drugs" to the list.
16. People v. Overton, 293 Mich. 44, 291 N.W. 216 (1940).
17. In People v. Orlando, 305 Mich. 686, 9 N.W.2d 893 (1943), the defendants were
found near the place where a stench bomb had been placed in a theater. Their clothing
smelled of the stench bomb, so the officers searched the defendants' automobile which was
parked several blocks away. Evidence which indicated that the defendants made a stench
bomb was found in the vehide and was held admissible since the search was legal.
18. Supra note 5.
19. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), stated that the Fourteenth Amendment,
which applies to the states, did not forbid the admission of relevant evidence even though
it was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.
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cause of the plighted motorist by saying that, regardless of admissibility,
searches and seizures must comply with the "incident to arrest" or "probable
cause" rules to be legal, and civil sanctions would be imposed upon officers in
instances of illegal search and seizure. These rules, said the Court, will be
applied equally to all searches regardless of where they take place.
The Court issued a firm warning to the police that searches of automobiles
will not be tolerated unless there is probable cause for believing a crime was
committed and the search is aimed at unveiling fruits of that crime or a means
of escape. It was pointed out that the only apparent wrong in the Gonzales
situation at the time the search was undertaken was a traffic violation. There
was no suspicion of any other violation of the law. The Court felt that mere
traffic violations are not grounds for conducting a legal search and seizure,
noting that the 1936 amendment to Article 2, section 10 of the Michigan
Constitution does not make more searches and seizures legal, it simply makes
more evidence admissible in spite of the fact that it was illegally obtained.
In its attempt to discern the intent behind the 1936 amendment the Court
took the position that this was as far as the legislature intended to go in trimming the general exclusionary rule prevailing in Michigan. An equally tenable
position concerning the intent is that the amendment serves to facilitate the
police efforts in their constant fight against crime, in the specific manner stated
in the amendment, and also serves to indicate a continuing trend in the direction
of relaxing the requirements for a legal search and seizure for purposes of
admissibility. The purpose behind the amendment was to allow more evidence
to be admissible. How, then, can the Court conclude, in the absence of any
express intent in the amendment, that beyond the terms of the amendment,
a stricter limitation on the meaning of legal search and seizure is dictated?
Such a conclusion seems unjustified in the face of the decisions rendered by the
Michigan Supreme Court before and since the 1936 amendment, construing
most searches and seizures of automobiles legal when they follow a valid arrest
regardless of the presence of cause for believing that the automobile harbored
fruits of a crime or a means of escape. The "means of escape" category of
permissible search following an arrest seems to be particularly absurd in the
instance of motor vehicles because the vehicle itself is an excellent means of
escape. How, then, can a position requiring the police to have cause for believing the vehicle contains a means of escape before they can legally search the
vehicle be sustained?
It is difficult to accept the Court's distinction of the Lewis case from the
Gonzales situation. In Lewis the court felt that the search was founded on
reasonable grounds for believing a felony was being committed in their presence,
namely, the occupant fumbling in his pockets was cause for believing he was
searching for a weapon. Is the Court suggesting that if the police see a driver
fumbling in his pockets they can lawfully search him and his car, but if the
driver has the foresight to situate a weapon on the seat next to him where he
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can put it to use without the difficulty of pulling it out of his pocket, that
driver is protected from being legally searched. The overall appearance of
the car and its occupants in the early hours of the morning in the Gonzales
case could very well have appeared more suspicious to the police than did the
"pocket-fumbler" in the Lewis case.
Forty years of judicial process in Michigan which attempted to keep
abreast of the increase in the number of automobiles, and the problems of law
enforcement that accompanied this increase, are challenged by the Gonzales
point of view. Possibly the Michigan decisions prior to Gonzales gave the
police as much freedom of search as was desirable. In the Gonzales case, the
suggestion by the Court that the police have been given too much leeway in
this area is difficult to accept in face of the steadily increasing crime rate
involving automobiles, particularly in the commission of robbery, rape, burglary, murder and kidnapping. The Michigan Supreme Court recognized the
usefulness of the automobile for unlawful purposes back in 1922 in People v.
Case.0 New York State, a non-exclusion jurisdiction, does not appear ready
to limit its police in the area of search and seizure of automobiles to the point
m 2suggested by the Gonzales opinion.
It does not seem to be too harsh an imposition on motorists to permit a
search of the automobile when the search accompanies an arrest for violations
of the law other than mere traffic violations, regardless of the purpose of the
search. The fact that the vehicle is itself an instrument useful in escape should
be cause enough to permit a search in conjunction with an arrest. Under such
a policy only the law breakers would be subjected to the search, thereby pacifying those who oppose the non-exclusionary rule because it conceivably permits
innocent persons to be subjected to intrusions of their privacy.
Another suggestion is that even mere traffic violations should be cause
enough for permitting the search of the accessible parts of a car as distinguished from the locked glove compartment or the locked trunk 2 2 Once again
only violators of the law would be subjected to having their car searched.
In any event it seems that the better policy is to wait for the police to
abuse their authority before limiting their activities to the extent suggested
in Gonzales. A final solution to this problem, applicable to all traffic on our
highways, is something to strive for but difficult to achieve. As Learned Hand
once said:
The protection of the individual from oppression and abuse by the
police and other enforcing officers is indeed a major interest in a free
society; but so is the effective prosecution of crime, an interest which
at times seems to be forgotten. - Perfection is impossible; like other
human institutions criminal proceedings must be a compromise. 23
20.
21.

Supra note 8.
People v. Houghtaling, 16 Misc. 2d 459, 181 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1959).

22.

Turner, Search and Seizure-Search of an Automobile Without a Search Warrant,

43 Ky.LJ. 163 (1954).
23. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, at 465 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Recognition of the distinction between a dwelling house and a vehicle,
and the lesser protection of privacy accorded the latter, should be a starting
point for future attempts at a practical compromise between the protection of
individual rights and the furtherance of effective law enforcement.
PAUL C. WEAVER

NECESSARY STATUS FOR COVERAGE UNDER THE JONES ACT.
Federal law, by means of the Jones Act provides that "Any seaman who
shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law."' On the other hand the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides fixed weekly compensation payments for employees injured on navigable waters (including any
2
dry dock) and where applicable is the exclusive remedy. It explicitly eliminates
3
from its coverage vessel's crew members.
In Taylor v. Central R.R. Co. of N. J., an action brought in a New York
Court, a bridge carpenter was injured while removing lumber from a dock and
placing it on a lighter for transportation to the other end of the dock. At no
time during this trip was the lighter to lose contact with the dock and in fact,
it did not even possess means of self-propulsion. It was moved along the dock
by winch-operated lines. The plaintiff alleged that lack of equipment (nets)
aboard rendered the vessel unseaworthy as required by the Jones Act and that
this was the cause of his injury. On trial the Court submitted the question
of plaintiff's status as a seaman and the issues of defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury, but refused to charge on the
question of seaworthiness. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the
plaintiff was covered by the Jones Act, or so a jury could find, and was thus
4
entitled to a charge on the issue of seaworthiness.
A shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness, to those covered by the Jones
5
Act, is absolute and is imposed regardless of fault. The doctrine is based on
the need for protection of seamen who have signed articles for a voyage and
are thus put under control of the ship's master. Such seamen can be compelled
to do the ship's work in any weather, under any conditions, using whatever
equipment may be furnished. 6 This concept of strict liability is firmly entrenched in our maritime law, appearing as early as 1789 in Dixon v. The
Cyrus where it was stated that,
1. 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) as amended 41 Stat. 1007 (1920).
2. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 905-911 (1958).
3. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958).
'4. Supreme Court, New York County not reported, reversed - A.D.2d -, 191
N.Y.S.2d 690 (1st Dep't 1959).
5. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierachi, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Dimas v. Lehigh VaL Ry.,
234 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1956).
6. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
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